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rESUMEN
En este artículo se lleva a cabo una reconstrucción de la deconstrucción que realiza Paul de Man 
de la célebre distinción kantiana entre la filosofía transcendental y la metafísica, tal y como ésta 
es expuesta en la Crítica del Juicio. En lugar de considerar que pertenecen a dos esferas sepa-
radas, en el artículo se muestra cómo, según de Man, se da una transición entre ellas que sólo 
se puede explicar bajo la forma de un cortocircuito tropológico o lingüístico que Kant mismo 
realiza, pero de manera inconsciente. También se pone de relieve que la noción kantiana de lo 
sublime, escondida bajo la categoría de lo estético, cumple la función ideológica de reprimir la 
constitución inherentemente lingüística de todo conocimiento.
PaLabraS CLavE
CríTICa, dECoNSTrUCCIóN, ESTéTICa, IdEoLogía
abSTraCT
This article carefully reconstructs Paul de Man’s deconstruction of Kant’s distinction between 
transcendental philosophy and metaphysics, as the latter appears in The Critique of Judgment. 
Instead of posing these two as belonging to two separate spheres, the paper shows how, accor-
ding to de Man, there is a transition between them that can only be accounted for in terms of 
a tropological or linguistic trick that Kant himself realizes, yet unaware of it. The paper also 
discusses that Kant’s notion of the sublime has an ideological function disguised under the 
category of the aesthetic, and which amounts to a denial of the inherently linguistic constitution 
of all knowledge.
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I. DeconstructIon as crItIque of IDeology
In the artIcle «PhenomenalIty and Materiality in Kant», de Man distin-
guishes, following Kant’s Critique of Judgment, between transcendental and 
metaphysical philosophy1. he wants to reformulate this distinction, not in terms 
of a stable separation like the one put forward by Kant, but instead in terms 
of a relationship between critique and ideology. I would like to argue in this 
paper that it is precisely this relationship that grounds Paul de Man’s project of 
deconstruction. as it is well known, In Kant’s view, metaphysical philosophy 
asserts that partial knowledge is possible as a consequence of the so-called 
empirical data provided by sensual, empirical, natural, worldly or real sources 
(metaphysical principles) existing outside conceptual knowledge. although 
metaphysical knowledge is cognitively necessary, however, it is not in itself 
sufficient. If the knowledge that is provided by metaphysical principles is to 
be valid, that is, if it is not to remain as simple non-processed data, something 
else is required which can only be provided by a transcendental viewpoint. 
Transcendental philosophy ensures that knowledge remains within the confines 
of concepts (transcendental principles) and it brings to light the conditions that 
make the sources of metaphysical knowledge perceptible in the first place. If 
metaphysics can claim that there are bodies, for instance, this is because trans-
cendental knowledge furnishes the category of substance; or, if metaphysics 
can contend that bodies or things move and change, this can only be validly 
ascertained because there are transcendental categories of relation.
Now, we can reformulate Kant’s distinction between transcendental and 
metaphysical principles in linguistic terms so that the former can be seen to 
constitute (transcendental) knowledge that is mediated by language and the 
latter can be seen to constitute (metaphysical) knowledge that is supposed to be 
given by empirical or extra-linguistic sources. The argument of Kant’s critique 
is that no valid knowledge can be provided by extra-linguistic sources, that is, 
that only what which is or can be conceptualized can be known at all; language 
is the condition of possibility of knowledge. Metaphysics consists of the belief 
that extra-linguistic data can directly or immediately provide knowledge; or, in 
de Man’s words, it rests upon a «confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of 
reference with phenomenalism» (1990, p. 23) Metaphysics affirms that the things 
that we talk about can be known independently of the concepts that we use to 
name them, that is, as given facts or natural objects (metaphysical principles).
1 Paul de Man, «Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant» (1996b, pp. 70-90); Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Introduction, section v: «The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness 
of Nature Is a Transcendental Principle of Judgment», Indianapolis, Cambridge, hackett, 1987, 
pp. 20-26.
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In contradistinction to metaphysics, then, valid knowledge is always, for 
Kant, mediated through categories or transcendental principles. In themselves, 
however, these categories are empty, they contain no information: they are the 
condition of possibility of facts or objects being perceived at all. It follows 
from this that even if metaphysical principles cannot constitute knowledge 
by themselves, they are the content that fills out transcendental principles. In 
Kant’s distinction, then, transcendental philosophy knows nothing about the 
world; its task is simply to criticize metaphysical philosophy. The question that 
immediately arises here is the following: how can we actually know some-
thing about the world and, at the same time, guarantee that this knowledge is 
valid? valid knowledge, Kant replies, is to be conceived as a process through 
which the information provided by metaphysics is criticized by transcendental 
philosophy. Knowledge proceeds as a transcendental critique of metaphysical 
philosophy.
If we carefully examine Kant’s argument, de Man claims, the distinction 
between metaphysical and transcendental philosophy reveals itself to be not 
as strict as it is supposed to be. For if valid knowledge proceeds as a trans-
cendental critique of metaphysical philosophy, then transcendental principles 
require metaphysical principles in order even to be formed, just as metaphysical 
principles require transcendental principles in order to be valid. Transcendental 
knowledge is, in itself, empty; and metaphysics is, in itself, blind. In de Man’s 
view, Kant’s argument necessarily leads to the conclusion that there is a relatio-
nship between metaphysics and transcendental philosophy. These two distinct 
yet interdependent instances of knowledge can, he continues, be redenomina-
ted: metaphysics can be called ideology and transcendental philosophy can be 
called critique or critical philosophy. Knowledge is conceived as a process of 
critique that cannot collapse the difference between these two moments: «The 
possibility of maintaining the causal link between them [critique and ideology] 
is the controlling principle of rigorous philosophical discourse: philosophies 
that succumb to ideology lose their epistemological sense, whereas philosophies 
that try to by-pass or repress ideology lose all critical thrust and risk being 
repossessed by what they foreclose» (1996b, p. 72).
This difference and interdependence between critique and ideology be-
comes clearer if we introduce a slight change of terminology. Ideology claims 
that certain extra-linguistic facts or real objects in the world are the cause of 
our beliefs, that is, that they have a normative impact upon our knowledge. on 
some occasions this fact in the world is considered as stable —as a fixed entity, 
for instance— and on others it is conceived as undergoing change —as a natu-
ral process, for instance. In both cases, it is ideological to think that the entity 
or process in the world has a normative impact upon the beliefs that we hold. 
The importance of Kant’s argument resides in the following realization: we can 
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only avoid ideology when we take everything that we know to be conceptually 
mediated or interpreted. Extra-linguistic facts or objects can only become part of 
what we know when they are linguistically conceived. Just as importantly, howe-
ver, Kant’s reasoning also shows that —even if we can only know things when 
they are conceptually mediated— language does not itself constitute the world. 
Language always and necessarily refers to something, talks about something, 
even if the awareness of this something is always already linguistically mediated. 
we lapse into linguistic idealism, then, when we ignore that language refers to 
something; and we lapse into ideology when we think that this something exists 
in a realm wholly external to language. The referential function of language, the 
difference between the words that we use and the things that are named by them, 
is internal to language itself. The claims of Kant and de Man about the necessary 
conceptuality of knowledge and their concomitant critiques of metaphysics and 
ideology —as phenomena that deny or ignore this conceptual mediation— are 
coterminous, to give another example that could illustrate this point, with those 
of a philosopher in the analytic tradition: recall here donald davidson’s famous 
criticisms of the concept of empirical content. Similarly, the idea of the internal 
division of language as a fracture or relationship of difference between words 
and things is coterminous with davidson’s claim that the difference between 
word and world is internal to language itself2.
Now, we could also reformulate this difference between the words that 
we use and the things that they name in terms of a tension between semiotics 
and semantics. The semiotic dimension of language entails that we presuppose 
words in order to speak about things; its semantic dimension entails that we 
always refer to something when we speak. Ideology can be conceived, then, as 
the attempt to eliminate the difference and relationship between the semiotic 
and semantic dimensions of language, dimensions intrinsic to knowledge and 
communication. when ideology takes things or facts to be given in a realm 
outside language, it forgets that any thing or fact, in order to be known at all, 
has first to be named by language. Ideology forgets or represses the fact that 
we have to presuppose concepts in order to name things and that this naming 
by concepts necessarily refers to something.
It is in this light that de Man’s appropriation of Kant’s distinction between 
transcendental philosophy and metaphysics can be clarified. Kant’s distinction 
between transcendental principles and metaphysical principles —once it is seen 
to entail a relationship of interdependence, and not a strict separation— can be 
2 donald davidson, «on the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme», in Inquiries into Truth 
& Interpretation, oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 183-198; and especially: «Empirical Content», 
in Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. by Ernest 
Lepore, oxford: basil blackwell, 1986, pp. 320-332.
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transposed into that between semiotics and semantics. Transcendental principles 
are the categories through which we know things. because they always depend 
upon metaphysical principles, however, they can be construed as the concepts 
that we presuppose when we refer to things (semiotics). Metaphysical principles 
tell us about the world in a non-reliable way. because these principles are always 
related to the transcendental categories, however, they can be construed as the 
things that we talk about or refer to by means of language (semantics)3.
II. aesthetIc IDeology
we have seen that Kant’s distinction between transcendental principles 
and metaphysical principles cannot be maintained on the basis of his own 
conception of valid knowledge; it has, instead, to be construed in terms of a 
relationship of interdependence. Kant himself, however, always retained this 
distinction. The Critique of Judgment can be interpreted as Kant’s attempt to 
explain the interrelation between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. I 
want to briefly concentrate now on de Man’s analysis of the mode in which Kant 
accounts in this text for the transition between metaphysics and transcendental 
philosophy. according to de Man, Kant attempts to conceive of an exchange 
between metaphysics and transcendental philosophy —despite their initially 
strict separation— by means of an unconscious use of figurative discourse. It is 
only by means of tropes, the movements of which can be traced in Kant’s texts, 
that ideology and critique —metaphysics and transcendental philosophy— can 
be seen to effectively interact. The tropological movements of Kant’s texts 
also reveal that we always require concepts in order to talk about something, 
that is, that, even when ideology denies it, the use of language to refer to the 
world is inescapable. It is this realization that leads de Man to formulate the 
following two arguments. Firstly, there is in language an intrinsic ideological 
moment that cannot be done away with. we need to refer to something and this 
need constitutes a moment of the denial or forgetfulness of language. Secondly, 
the movement from this ideological moment of reference to the moment of a 
reflection upon the social use of language —the movement of the critique of 
ideology— implies an awareness of the language’s tropological movement.
given that Kant presupposes a strict separation between metaphysics 
and transcendental philosophy, how can he explain the movement, process or 
3 de Man does not use this terminology. his equivalent for semiotics is what he calls 
«grammar»: «The system of relationship generated by the text and that functions independently 
of its referential meaning is grammatical. Insofar as a text is grammatical, it is a logical code or 
a machine» (1990, p. 306). Semantics is conceived as referential meaning.
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relationship between them? The strict separation between transcendental philo-
sophy and metaphysics means, for Kant, that there can in no circumstances be 
a mutual interchange between them, it means that they have a different onto-
logical status: transcendental principles are linguistic; metaphysical principles 
are extra-linguistic. how, then, is the transformation from empirical data to 
critical and conceptual knowledge possible? what is it that allows empirical or 
metaphysical principles to be comprehended as valid? Kant can obviously not 
reply to this question by claiming that the movement is carried out by metaphy-
sical knowledge itself, for this would be to imply a pre-critical step, one that 
could never guarantee the validity of such a process. he is therefore forced to 
maintain that the cognitive movement, since it cannot be metaphysical, simply 
resembles the movement of bodies. It is this comparison that determines Kant’s 
argument. The movement or transformation from metaphysics to transcendental 
knowledge has, on the one hand, to be transcendental, it has to be generated 
by the conceptual apparatus or system and, on the other hand, it has to be a 
movement similar to the metaphysical movement of bodies. The problem is to 
determine the categories that can be understood as the condition of possibility of 
this movement of the transcendental critique of metaphysics. de Man proposes 
the following interpretation of the problem and its supposed solution:
If critical philosophy and metaphysics (...) are causally linked to each other, their 
relationship is similar to the relationship (...) between bodies and their transforma-
tion or motions. Critical philosophy and ideology [or transcendental philosophy and 
metaphysics (S.a.)] then become each other’s motion: if an ideology is considered 
to be a stable entity (body, corpus, or canon), the critical discourse it generates 
will be that of a transcendental motion, of a motion whose cause resides, so to 
speak, within itself, within the substance of its own being. and if the critical sys-
tem is considered stable in its principles, the corresponding ideology will acquire 
a mobility caused by a principle that lies outside itself; this principle, within the 
confines of the system thus constituted, can only be the principle of constitution, 
the architectonics of the transcendental system that functions as the cause of the 
ideological motions. In both cases, it is the transcendental system, as substance or 
as structure, that determines the ideology and not the reverse. (1996b p. 72)
In order to account for the cognitive process of the transcendental critique 
of metaphysics, Kant refers, on the one hand, to the metaphysical or empirical 
fact that objects move and, on the other hand, to the transcendental or linguistic 
categories of substance and relation. but if metaphysical principles and trans-
cendental principles interact with one another and, at the same time, remain 
strictly distinct, how can Kant comprehend the process of transformation as a 
transcendental one? Let us recall here that this process is supposed to resemble 
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the movement of bodies. This comparison follows from the original distinction 
between metaphysics and transcendental philosophy. Kant presupposes that, 
because these two instances of knowledge are strictly distinct, the movement 
between them has to be «external» to their own constitution. If the metaphysical 
and transcendental principles remained stable then the critical movement could 
not be said to occur at all; and, if Kant did not presuppose the original distinc-
tion, then this movement would have to be construed as a constant occurrence. 
Moreover, because the metaphysical and transcendental principles are distinct, 
it also follows that they are limited, that is, that they can be said to form two 
different sets of systems.
we can therefore infer from Kant’s original dichotomy —from the fact 
transcendental and metaphysical principles cannot move and, at the same time, 
be stable, and from the fact that they form separate and finite sets or systems— 
the following two possible accounts of the transcendental critique of metaphy-
sics. Firstly, the system of metaphysical principles or extra-linguistic facts can 
be conceived as stable (as a body) and the system of transcendental principles 
as moving (as a relation). on this account, the condition of possibility of the 
cognitive movement would be the substance of the system of transcendental 
principles itself, that is, the very substance of the transcendental system would 
be conceived as movement. Secondly, the system of metaphysical principles 
or extra-linguistic facts can be conceived as moving (as change) and the sys-
tem of transcendental principles or concepts as stable (as substance). on this 
account, the cognitive movement cannot be accounted for by the movement 
of the transcendental principles themselves, for, as we have already seen, this 
would imply a pre-critical or metaphysical step. The condition of possibility 
of this movement can only be construed as a consequence of the constitution 
of the system of transcendental principles, as a consequence of the structure 
or architectonic of the conceptual apparatus. In both cases, then —either when 
the system of metaphysical principles is conceived as moving and the system 
of transcendental principles as stable, or vice versa— it is the system of trans-
cendental principles, that is, the substance or structure of language, that proves 
to be the condition of possibility of the transcendental critique of metaphysics. 
The logic of Kant’s argument leads to the following unavowed thesis: it is only 
because language has a substance or structure that the critical knowledge of 
ideology can proceed.
Kant is forced to claim, then, that it is the very movable substance or 
structure of language that generates the critical transition from metaphysics to 
transcendental philosophy. It is important to emphasize here that Kant does not 
explicitly make this claim. his philosophical project, which proceeds, as we have 
just seen, from the overcoming of an original separation, needs to be presented 
in such a way that this separation is concealed. In his article on Kant, de Man 
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therefore wants to show that Kant’s implicit claims about the nature of language 
(as a substance or structure) are the result of this original strict separation. once 
again, Kant does not explicitly defend, he defends them implicitly as a conse-
quence of his own unconscious reliance upon figurative language. as de Man 
puts it, following walter benjamin, these claims form part of Kant’s «way of 
saying (Art des Sagens) as opposed to what is being said (das Gesagte)» (1996b 
p. 89). Kant never openly declares, that is, that language has a substance or a 
structure, nor does he realize that he is using figurative language to account for 
the relation and distinction between metaphysics and critique.
I want to briefly summarize now the main steps in de Man’s deconstruction 
of Kant. what is it, he asks, that allows Kant to think of language as a substan-
ce or structure? In attempting to answer this question, de Man concentrates, 
firstly, on Kant’s notion of the sublime4 —the status of this notion within the 
Critique of Judgement is that of a transcendental medium that ensures the 
transition between metaphysics and transcendental philosophy. de Man wants 
to show that the supposedly transcendental operations of the sublime are in 
fact rhetorical mechanisms. The sublime is, Kant contends, a transcendental 
principle, that is, it is not a property of nature (a metaphysical principle), but 
instead «an inward experience of consciousness (Gemütsbestimmung)», (1996 
b p. 74) albeit one that needs to be phenomenally represented. It can also be 
divided, he claims, into the dynamic sublime and the mathematical sublime5. 
The main characteristic of the sublime is that it is «borderless (unbegrenzt) yet 
a totality» (1996b, p. 75), that is, it is an infinite quantity that can nevertheless 
be empirically intuited. In de Man’s view, a meticulous examination of the two 
acts of the imagination that account for the description of the sublime, that is, 
in Kant’s terminology, of «apprehension» (Auffassung) and «comprehension» 
(Zusammenfassung), demonstrates that they in fact represent two uses of 
language: syntagmatic successions of and paradigmatic substitutions between 
different linguistic elements.
what Kant conceives as two purely epistemological or transcendental ope-
rations are in fact, de Man claims, two linguistic manoeuvres: «apprehension» 
(Auffassung) is the syntagmatic setting of meanings in sequence within senten-
4 The notion of the beautiful articulates the relationship between understanding («Vers-
tand») and judgment; the notion of the sublime articulates the relationship between reason 
(«Vernunft») and judgment. The possibility of a critical philosophy rests only in the formulation 
of the concept of the sublime.
5 The mathematical sublime concerns size or magnitude, the dynamical sublime concerns 
power or might. we will immediately see that the former corresponds to language as a non-li-
mited totality and the latter to language as a moving substance. Critique of Judgement, § 25-28, 
pp. 103-123.
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ces (as, for instance, when we add a predicate to a subject); «comprehension» 
(Zusammenfassung) is the paradigmatic substitution of meanings for other equi-
valent meanings (as in metaphor). These two linguistic (and epistemological) 
manoeuvres are interdependent and occur whenever we think and speak: when 
we add new information we do it syntagmatically; when we relate meanings to 
other meanings as if the former were part of the latter we do it paradigmatically. 
It is the interaction between these two functions, moreover, that allows Kant 
to conceive language as a limitless totality or moving substance: paradigmatic 
substitutions embrace meanings as if they were part of other meanings (wholes), 
and these other meanings can always come to form part of other new wholes. 
Language expands by incorporating meanings that include other meanings; or 
it contracts when inclusive or comprehensive meanings are contradicted by 
new information that is syntagmatically added. as de Man concludes, «The 
desired articulation of the sublime takes place (...) within such a purely formal 
system [discourse as a tropological system]. It follows, however, that it is 
conceivable only within the limits of such a system, that is, as pure discourse 
rather than as a faculty of the mind. (...) The sublime cannot be grounded as a 
philosophical (transcendental or metaphysical) principle, but only as a linguistic 
principle.» (1996b, p. 78) de Man’s sustained interrogation of Kant’s argument 
reveals, then, its two unavowed presuppositions: firstly, that the sublime —as 
the intermediary between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics— is not 
a faculty of the mind, but language conceived under the aspect of a limitless 
totality or moving substance; and, secondly, that the supposedly transcendental 
operations of the sublime are in fact linguistic (tropological and metaphorical) 
substitutions.
Secondly, de Man shows that Kant’s account of the transition from metaphy-
sics to transcendental philosophy resorts to tropes when it attempts to provide a 
reason for the performative effects (affects, moods or feelings) that the sublime 
produces. In order for the sublime to generate the feeling of tranquil admiration 
or superiority, Kant maintains, we have to perceive the world «as poets do (wie 
die Dichter es tun)» (1996b, p. 80), that is, as an architectonic construct: «The 
heavens are a vault that covers the totality of earthy space as a roof covers a 
house.» (1996b, p. 81). The perception of the world as an architectonic structure 
is, for Kant, an a priori transcendental principle. de Man therefore inquires 
what it is that allows Kant to draw this parallel with architectonics.
In Kant’s line of reasoning, de Man claims, there are two distinct yet com-
plementary accounts of the architectonic vision of nature: a figurative account 
and an allegorical one. I want to focus here on the first figurative account. ac-
cording to de Man, Kant’s first account employs the metaphor of the organic 
and structured unity or of the «totality of various limbs and parts» (1996b, p. 
88). This metaphor invests the aesthetic faculty with the capacity to conceive 
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language as a whole that encompasses different and contradictory significatio-
ns. These significations are those of «nature and reason, the imagination and 
nature, tranquillity and shock, adequacy and inadequacy, that separate, fight, 
and then unite in a more or less stable state of harmony, achieving synthesis 
and totalizations» (1996b, p. 87). Kant is here substituting the process that he 
first wanted to account for, de Man claims —the process of the transition from 
metaphysics to transcendental philosophy— with a metaphor that supposedly 
includes its two moments in a harmonious relationship. It is this substitution 
of the concept of the sublime with a conciliatory metaphor, de Man concludes, 
that constitutes aesthetic ideology. Aesthetic ideology is an unconscious use of 
figurative discourse that closes language off from its own inherent capacity for 
transformation. To close language off in this way implies two interrelated things. 
Firstly, it implies that language is conceived not as contingent and variable set 
of meanings, but as a stable system (such a conception necessarily follows, as 
we have seen, from Kant’s strict separation between transcendental and me-
taphysical principles). In order to conceive language as a stable system, Kant 
takes recourse to the metaphor of an all-inclusive totality or substance and of 
an organic and total structure. Secondly, this closing off implies an abolishing 
of the difference between critique and ideology. by unconsciously setting up a 
meaning (a substance or structure) that is supposed to account for the transition 
between metaphysical and transcendental principles, and by implicitly presu-
pposing that this all-encompassing meaning can harmoniously and unproble-
matically embrace both sets of principles, Kant conceals, and effectively does 
away with, that constitutive difference from which he originally departed —a 
difference which lies at the basis of the possibility of critique.
To briefly recapitulate, then, knowledge is seen to consist, for Kant, in the 
process of a critique of ideology. Knowledge emerges as a critique of that whi-
ch is mistakenly presupposed as given. Kant thus makes a distinction between 
metaphysical principles (which conceive their referent as a natural object) and 
transcendental principles (which provide the concepts, the conditions of possibi-
lity, for the perception of metaphysical principles). The transcendental critique of 
metaphysics establishes that knowledge depends upon both metaphysical princi-
ples and the transcendental principles that allow them to be known or grasped. 
In linguistic terms, Kant correctly demonstrates that knowledge is always and 
necessarily linguistic; and that metaphysical knowledge or ideology, in assuming 
that things or facts are given outside language, is mistaken. Kant wrongly as-
sumes, however, that transcendental and metaphysical principles belong to two 
wholly distinct sets that can never exchange positions. If Kant had perceived that 
transcendental and metaphysical principles depend upon one another whilst, at 
the same time, remaining distinct, he might have inferred the possibility of an 
interchanging of roles between them. he might have noticed that they are not 
39Deconstruction as Critique of Ideology
Contrastes vol. XI (2006)
limited systems, but meanings that are contingently adopted in one of two modes: 
referential (metaphysical) and presuppositional (transcendental). what Kant did 
not perceive, that is, is that he was unknowingly talking about language; he did 
not perceive that his two supposedly distinct sets of principles were in fact the 
two interrelated functions of language: semantics and semiotics.
Kant did not know, then, that he was writing and thinking about language. 
de Man denominates this unawareness as a resistance to theory: «The resis-
tance to theory is a resistance to the use of language about language» (1990, 
p. 25); and, concomitantly, it is «a resistance to the rhetorical or tropological 
dimension of language» (1990, p. 32) I want now to show how a reflection 
upon language —which is always a struggle against this resistance— reveals 
the exchange between semantics and semiotics, an exchange that Kant could 
ignore but not completely do away with. It is this reflection upon language 
—including figurative language— that lies, I want to argue, at the basis of the 
critique of ideology. de Man denominates as «blind» that use of language that 
mistakenly and unconsciously understands the referential function as a real 
entity. blindness is coterminous, that is, with ideology. In contradistinction 
to this blind or ideological use, the use of language is «insightful» when it 
operates according to the «unstated principle that leads his [the critic’s or the 
philosopher’s] language away from its asserted stand, perverting and dissolving 
his stated commitment to the point where it becomes emptied of substance, as 
if the very possibility of assertion has been put into question.» (1971, p. 103) 
Kant’s blindness, de Man is arguing —if we transpose his claim into the context 
of our discussion— could not completely do away with language: it is Kant’s 
own unconscious use of figurative language, his blind or ideological claim 
that something is natural or real, that opens up the space for de Man’s critical 
insight. or, as de Man puts it in Allegories of Reading: «deconstruction is not 
something added to the text, it is itself constituted in the text» (1990, p. 31). de 
Man’s article on the Critique of Judgment shows that, on the one hand, Kant 
blindly maintains that there is a rigid separation between ideology and critique 
and, on the other hand, insightfully demonstrates that there is a relationship of 
exchange between them. This insight is worked out by language itself, by de 
Man’s translation of Kant’s blindness into insight. de Man reads the Critique 
of Judgment and discovers what the text itself says in opposition to Kant’s own 
resistance. For even if Kant wants to separate out semantics and semiotics, the 
fact is that they must always interact in every act of communication. de Man’s 
original claim is, then, the following: Kant’s insight into the necessary exchange 
between semantics and semiotics is made possible by a blind and unconscious 
recourse to figurative language.
Figurative language can be said to possess, then, two important and inte-
rrelated functions (it can be said to say two things): it insightfully asserts and, 
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at the same time, blindly denies the linguistic constitution of knowledge. To 
deny the linguistic knowledge nature of knowledge is to take figurative langua-
ge literally. de Man shows, for instance, that Kant employs the metaphors of 
building and organic unity in his discussions of aesthetic judgement. If we do 
not realize that Kant is using figurative language, then we univocally think that 
aesthetic judgement can be represented (literally, ideologically or blindly) as 
an organic unity. Furthermore, de Man claims, when a metaphor is used blin-
dly it usually employs a totalizing meaning. It is as a consequence of this that 
metaphor establishes within the text relationships of inclusion and exclusion: 
«It is absurd to ask whether a code is true or false, but impossible to bracket 
this question when tropes are involved —and this always seems to be the case. 
whenever the question is repressed, tropological patterns reenter the system 
in the guise of such formal categories as polarity (....) They are always again 
totalizing systems that try to ignore the disfiguring power of figuration» (1996, 
p. 49). Kant employs the metaphors of building and structure to account for the 
concept of the sublime, a concept that is supposed to facilitate the exchange 
between metaphysical and transcendental principles. It follows that whereas 
transcendental principles —conceived as part of language— remain within 
the structure or building, metaphysical principles —conceived as external to 
language— are left outside. The polarity between the metaphysical and trans-
cendental principles, and the epistemological priority that is accorded to the 
latter, is the consequence of Kant’s unconscious use of metaphor.
The second function of figurative language is critical, it demands an 
awareness of language itself. In understanding aesthetic judgement as an or-
ganic unity, we can explicitly realize that Kant is using a metaphor. This step 
is critical because instead of repressing figurative language it asks about its 
truth or falsity. To show that the idea of organic unity is metaphorical means 
to be aware that language has been used to convey a meaning different to the 
usual one. The usual meaning applies to physical bodies, the new metaphorical 
meaning applies to aesthetic judgement.
The insightful awareness of figurative language (critique) can be said to 
carry out, then, two interrelated tasks. Firstly, it displays the two components 
of this language. whereas ideology claims that only one meaning is in play or. 
rather, a natural or real fact that is supposed to exert normative impact upon 
knowledge («The figure des-figures, that is, it makes fear [de Man here alludes 
to rousseau’s reference to a so-called «real» fact] which, in itself, is a para-
figured fiction, into an inescapable reality (...) Metaphor presupposes a world in 
which we could distinguish between intra and extra-linguistic events, between 
literal and figurative forms of language; a world in which the figurative and 
the literal are properties that can be isolated. (....) This is a mistake, although 
we can say that no language could be possible without it» (1990, p. 176-7)), 
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critique draws attention to the two interrelated meanings (the usual and the 
metaphorical) that are necessarily at work in figurative language. Secondly, 
the insightful awareness of figurative language inverts these two meanings. 
whereas deology takes the meaning literally and conceives it as a real fact, 
critique takes it metaphorically and shows that it can also be read literally. That 
which is literal for ideology becomes metaphorical for critique. In displaying 
this inversion of meanings, critique can be comprehended as an awareness of 
the constant exchange between the two essential functions of language (se-
mantics and semiotics). 
what remains, however, of literalness for the critical or insightful gaze? Is 
figurative language all there is? on the basis of what has been argued above, 
this is clearly not the case. In the first place, we need to take things literally 
or ideologically in order even to understand what we are talking about. as de 
Man puts it: «To understand means primarily to determine the referential mode 
of a text, and we have to assume that this is possible» (1990, p. 231). In the 
second place, we also need to figure out whether what we are talking about is 
actually meant literally or, as de Man claims: «Every reading implies an elec-
tion between signification and symbolization, and this choice can only be done 
if we presuppose the possibility of distinguishing between the literal and the 
figurative.» (ibid.) If Kant and de Man read the sentence «aesthetic judgment 
is an organic unity,» they will both understand the words that form it. but, 
whereas Kant will inadvertently take the usual literal meaning of the words to 
be the same as that which he intends them to mean, that is, will not notice that 
he has used a metaphor, de Man will see a difference between these two things, 
between the usual (semiotic) meaning and the intended (semantic) one. de 
Man acknowledges, that is, an inversion or exchange between semantics and 
semiotics that remains invisible to Kant. or, in the terminology of the chapter 
1, whereas Kant holds on to a mistakenly strict conception of literal meaning, 
de Man correctly conceives this literalness as a function of language, one that 
always be inverted by its figurative use.
The strict conception of literalness is mistaken because it assumes a stable 
and static relationship between word and meaning, between word and world. 
It forgets, that is, that the tie between meaning and signification is radically 
contingent. (1996b, p. 93, p. 96) The strict conception of literal meaning also 
assumes that these meanings are organized into a totality and, hence, that lan-
guage forms a closed system of meanings that univocally correspond to words. 
by contrast, the conception of literalness as a function of language draws at-
tention to the presupposed reference of a literal utterance and the presupposed 
(literal) meaning of a figurative one. Literalness can only be ascertained within 
language, that is, contextually; it is constantly set in motion by the blind use 
of figurative language. as de Man insightfully puts it: «we have no way of 
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defining, or policing, the boundaries that separate the name of one entity from 
the name of another; tropes are not just travelers, they tend to be smugglers and 
probably smugglers of stolen goods at that. what makes matters even worse is 
that there is no way of finding out whether they do so with criminal intent or 
not.» (1996b, p. 39) and similarly: «Entities, in themselves, are neither distinct 
nor defined; no one could say where one entity ends and where another begins» 
(1996b, p. 44).
Ideology forgets that reference is a fluctuating and unstable function of 
language and takes it as a real entity or fact in the world. according to de Man, 
however, ideology cannot be simply eliminated from language. Ideology is 
a necessary moment of language that can only be criticized by means of an 
awareness of language itself. or, as andrzej warminski, the editor of de Man’s 
Aesthetic Ideology, claims, reiterating a thesis of althusser: «we are never so 
much ‘in’ ideology as when we think ourselves to be ‘outside’ it»6. For both 
Kant and de Man, however, and for anybody who deals with language, things 
are named by concepts and can only be known through them, whether this is 
acknowledged or not. To constantly forget this (as a consequence of the re-
ferential function of language) is to constantly assume an unphilosophical or 
ideological standpoint; and to reflectively overcome this forgetting, again and 
again, is to engage in critique.
The exchange between semantics and semiotics goes on, then, ad infini-
tum, and ideology keeps forgetting about it. deconstruction takes the aware-
ness of this exchange between semantics and semiotics as the primary task of 
knowledge, that is, it incessantly questions meanings that are supposed to be 
strictly literal (that are supposed to correspond to extra-linguistic facts and real 
entities) by drawing attention to their dependence upon intra-linguistic and, 
hence, figurative references and movements. we can respond to the claim «the 
body is an organic unity», for example, by inquiring whether it is to be taken 
literally or figuratively. To ask this question is to ask whether this statement 
is ideological or not, that is, whether it is assumed as a fact of nature or as so-
mething conceptually mediated. as soon as something is literally meant, that 
is, a figurative movement will always and necessarily follow from it. we can 
interpret deconstruction as a form of reading that never ceases with this kind of 
questioning: it assumes, on the one hand, an ideological moment in everything 
that is said and, on the other hand, it maintains itself in a middle ground in 
order to reveal the constant figurative movement of language7. deconstruction 
6 Louis althusser, «Ideology and Ideological State apparatuses», in Lenin and Philosophy, 
London, New Left books, 1971, pp. 127-86. (aI, p. 10)
7 This explains why deconstruction, especially in derrida’s version, almost exclusively 
searches for the ideological or metaphysical moment of whatever is said or written. The question
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locates itself, that is, in a middle ground between the two functions of figurative 
discourse. It is for this reason that deconstruction primarily asserts undecida-
bility, that is, always asks «is this literal or figurative?» It demands a reading 
that decides upon this question —but one that can in turn become subject to 
the same kind of questioning.
III. conclusIon
de Man’s analysis of Kant’s conception of the sublime reveals that the 
latter’s text contains a use of figurative language unaware of its own status. 
he calls this kind of use of language aesthetic ideology, that is, an ideological 
function disguised under the category of the aesthetic (the faculty that is sup-
posed to account for the transition between metaphysical and transcendental 
principles). There are infinite ways in which ideology can be concealed, and 
all of them rely upon a moment that is as constitutive of language as commu-
nication itself. Ideological claims always confuse the referential function of 
language with an extra-linguistic reality. an ideological claim is made when 
a supposedly real or natural entity is blindly posited as a normative constraint 
upon knowledge, or when a metaphor is employed that sets itself up as strictly 
literal. Kant’s implicit recourse, with regard to language, to the metaphors of 
structure and building lays bare that the belief in the normativity of a real or 
natural given and the use of a concealed metaphor amount to the same thing. 
we blindly or ideologically posit something as a «given», as a fixed and de-
termined entity or natural process that constrains language from outside; and 
critical awareness subsequently reveals that such a claim is constituted through 
figurative language. Kant wanted to account for the transition from metaphy-
sical to transcendental philosophy, that is, for the critique of ideology or for 
the exchange between semantics and semiotics, and he ultimately did this by 
means of aesthetic ideology. It was this unconscious lapse into aesthetic ideo-
logy that thwarted Kant’s articulation of the process from ideology to critique. 
because ideology always establishes something as strictly literal, that is, as 
extra-linguistic, it follows that aesthetic ideology must also deny the inherently 
linguistic constitution of all knowledge.
to ask deconstruction, then, is why do we necessarily need to presuppose the unavoidability of 
metaphysics? For a discussion of this problematic in de Man, see Ästhetik und Rhetorik. Lektüren 
zu Paul de Man, ed. by Karl heinz bohrer, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993; and Christoph 
Menke, «“Unglückliches bewußtsein”», in Literatur und Kritik bei Paul de Man. Die Ideologie 
des Ästhetischen, ed. by Christoph Menke, Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp, pp. 265-299.
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